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Moral Rights in the US: Still in Need of a Guardian Ad Litem 
 
Jane C. Ginsburg* 
 
Abstract 
 
 Over ten years ago in the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment 
Law Journal, I inquired whether authors’ “moral rights” had come 
of (digital) age in the US.  Ever-hopeful at that time, I suggested 
that then-recent legislation enacted to enable the copyright law to 
respond to the challenges of digital media might, in addition to its 
principal goal of securing digital markets for works of authorship, 
also provide new means to protect authors’ interests in receiving 
attribution for their works and in safeguarding their integrity.  The 
intervening years’ developments, however, indicate that, far from 
achieving their majority, US authors’ moral rights remain in their 
infancy, still in need of a guardian ad litem.  Nor is it clear what 
legal institution can assume that role.  Judicial interpretation of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act underscores that text’s 
limited utility as a legal basis for attribution rights.  Moreover, the 
US Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar v Twentieth-Century 
Fox has probably left authors worse off, because the Court 
removed recourse to the Lanham Trademarks Act as a source of 
attribution (and perhaps, integrity) rights.  If statutes and caselaw 
afford no general basis of moral rights, might the convergence of 
contract law and digital communications yield agreements, private 
in form but public in impact, that collectively approximate 
attribution and integrity rights?   
 
 This assessment of developments in moral rights in the U.S. 
since 2001 will first analyze the caselaw construing section 1202 
of the DMCA, which prohibits removal or alteration of “copyright 
management information.”  It will next summarize the damage 
Dastar has done to the development of moral rights.  Finally, I will 
consider the extent to which online contracts and practices may 
supply an effective basis for the assertion of attribution and 
integrity rights. De facto implementation of attribution rights 
through digital watermarking and other means of incorporating 
authorship information in connection with the communication of 
digital copies or performances of work make possible the 
recognition of many levels of creative contributions, but without a 
legal obligation to credit creators, it is unclear whether authorship 
information will remain connected to the copies of their works.  
                                                 
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School 
of Law.  Many thanks to John Schwab, Columbia Law School class of 2012. 
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Regarding integrity rights, respect for the work as the author 
created it may, in the absence of enforceable legal or contract 
norms, yield to online users’ preference for “remix.”  In that light, 
an alternative moral right of the author, proposed by Prof. Jessica 
Litman, and recounted in the previous AELJ essay, to compel 
comparison of the altered version with the original by obliging the 
modifying user to link back to it, is better than nothing.  But, 
without a legal obligation to disclose alterations or link back to the 
original, the prospects for even this weakened integrity right do 
not presage imminent adolescence, much less a vigorous 
adulthood, for moral rights in the US. 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
 Over ten years ago, in the pages of this Journal, I inquired whether 
authors’ “moral rights” had come of (digital) age in the US.1  Ever-hopeful at that 
time, I suggested that then-recent legislation enacted to enable the copyright law 
to respond to the challenges of digital media might, in addition to its principal 
goal of securing digital markets for works of authorship, also provide new means 
to protect authors’ interests in receiving attribution for their works and in 
safeguarding their integrity.  The intervening years’ developments, however, 
indicate that, far from achieving their majority, US authors’ moral rights remain 
in their infancy, still in need of a guardian ad litem.  Nor is it clear what legal 
institution can assume that role.  Judicial interpretation of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act underscores that text’s limited utility as a legal basis for attribution 
rights.  Moreover, the US Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar v Twentieth-
Century Fox2 has probably left authors worse off, because the Court removed 
recourse to the Lanham Trademarks Act as a source of attribution (and perhaps, 
integrity) rights.  If statutes and caselaw afford no general basis of moral rights, 
might the convergence of contract law and digital communications yield 
agreements, private in form but public in impact, that collectively approximate 
attribution and integrity rights?  Or will the shortcomings of “viral” contracts 
temper cyber-utopian enthusiasms, once again disappointing expectations in the 
ability of the regulation of digital media to secure authors’ rights? 
 
 This assessment of developments in moral rights in the U.S. since 2001 
will first analyze the caselaw construing section 1202 of the DMCA, which 
prohibits removal or alteration of “copyright management information.”  It will 
next summarize the damage Dastar has done to the development of moral rights.3  
                                                 
1 Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L. J. 9 (2001). 
2 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
3 This discussion derives from the analyses in Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in 
U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 263, 284--85 (2004) and the 2011 
Cumulative Supplement to Jane C. Ginsburg, Jessica Litman and Mary L. Kevlin, TRADEMARK 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (4th ed. 2007). 
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Finally, I will consider the extent to which online contracts and practices may 
supply an effective basis for the assertion of attribution and integrity rights.4 
 
II Protection of Copyright Management Information as a Source of 
Attribution and Integrity Rights 
 
 In my previous AELJ contribution, I posited “Moral Rights for the Digital 
Millennium,”5 primarily on the basis of section 1202’s prohibition on the removal 
or alteration of “copyright management information.”  My prior analysis 
nonetheless acknowledged the limited firepower of section 1202 in the moral 
rights arsenal.  For one thing, while the author’s name can be an element of 
statutorily protected copyright management information (CMI), the rightholder 
has no obligation to include the author’s name in the first place (though if it is 
included, it might be protected against removal).  Equally if not more 
significantly, section 1202 prohibits removals or alterations of CMI that facilitate 
copyright infringement, but (outside the extremely narrow context of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act) there is no right under copyright to authorship attribution; thus 
removal of the author’s name cannot of itself violate section 1202.6  Since the 
AELJ article, caselaw has further reinforced the statutory barriers (and even 
erected some new ones) to successful invocation of section 1202 to advance 
authorship attribution rights.   
                                                 
4 For a more extensive evaluation of one aspect of this issue, see Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Creative 
Commons: America’s Moral Rights?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 905 (2011). 
5 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 11--12. 
6 While the copyright owner, not the author (unless she is also a copyright owner), determines 
whether to affix CMI attributing the work to its creator, the author might have standing to bring a 
CMI claim for removal or alteration of authorship attribution.  Section 1303(a) provides that “any 
person injured by a violation of 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action . . .”  Is the author “injured” 
by removal of her name?  Arguably, the only “injured” party is the copyright owner, because a 
CMI violation results from actual or prospective copyright infringement.  In that case, even if the 
right holder includes the author’s name, and a third party removes it, the author will have no claim 
against the removal of her name if she is not also a copyright owner.  As a result, creators of works 
made for hire would have no standing to bring a CMI action unless the employer or 
commissioning party transfers exclusive rights to the creator.  Similarly, an author who has 
assigned all copyright interests without retailing a royalty interest would lack standing, while 
those who received royalties would be “beneficial copyright owners and could sue for 
infringement, see 17 U.S.C. sec. 501(b). 
 If, by contrast, “injury” sweeps more broadly to cover non-copyright interests implicated 
by CMI (including, perhaps, consumer interests in the accuracy and reliability of terms and 
conditions of payment for access to or copies of works), then non copyright owner authors might 
advance a CMI claim.  For example, with respect to violations of the section 1201 right against 
distribution of devices designed to circumvent technological measures protecting access to and 
copying of the work, courts have recognized that the producers of the technological protection 
measures have standing to sue the distributors of the circumvention devices.  See, e.g., 
RealNetworks v. Streambox,, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).  But in 
that instance, the interests of the copyright owners and of the producers of the technological 
measures are aligned.  In the case of removal of authorship attribution, by contrast, author and 
rightholder interests may in fact be opposed, but it seems clear that if the rightholder removes 
authorship attribution, the author (absent a contract obliging the rightholder to attribute the work) 
has no CMI claim against the rightholder. 
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 The caselaw has addressed three issues: What is “copyright management 
information”?; Where must copyright management information appear in order to 
be protected?; and What level of knowledge or intent violates section 1202?  
Regarding the first question, courts have divided over whether only identifying 
information that is part of an “automated copyright protection or management 
system” can be deemed CMI protected under section 1202.7  In those 
jurisdictions confining section 1202’s application to automated systems, authors 
will have no claim if their names are removed from non digitally-delivered 
hardcopies.  This truncation of the scope of CMI protection ignores the text of 
section 1202, which plainly envisions a broad application for CMI; section 
1202(c)(2) defines CMI as “any of the following information conveyed in 
connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of 
a work, including in digital form, except that such term does not include any 
personally identifying information about a user of a work or of a copy, 
phonorecord, performance, or display of a work . . .”  The specification of 
“including in digital form” clearly means that information not in digital form is 
also covered.  Some courts nonetheless justified their improbable reading of 
“including” to mean “only if” (and in addition, only if the digital information is 
part of a rights management system) on the ground that section 1202 was enacted 
as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; that the title of the chapter to 
which § 1201 and § 1202 belong is “Copyright Protection and Management 
Systems;” and that Congress’ goal in section 1202 was to foster electronic 
commerce.  As the Third Circuit recognized, however, that section 1202 emerged 
from a context of legislative responses to the challenges of digital 
communications neither precludes a more general role for CMI, nor compels such 
a substantial rewriting of the definition.  Thus, the statutory text does not justify 
this judge-made limitation on the application of section 1202 to authors’ 
attribution interests.8 
 A broad reading of CMI to include author-identifying information on 
analog as well as digital copies, and whether or not in connection with a rights 
management “system,” could mean that removal or alteration of a copyright 
notice bearing the author’s name, or of an author’s byline, even from analog 
copies, violates section 1202.  Removal standing alone, however, does not suffice.  
It is also necessary to consider what “conveyed in connection with copies or 
phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work” means, and, most 
importantly, whether the complaining author can surpass the statute’s high 
threshold for proving the requisite intent.   
 Regarding the location of CMI, some courts have interpreted “in 
connection with” to require that the identifying information be embedded in the 
                                                 
7 Compare IQ Group v. Wiesner Pub., LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006); Textile Secrets 
Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d. 1184, 1198 (CD. Cal. 2007) (CMI must be 
related to automated system) with Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group LLC, 650 F.3d 295(3d Cir. 
2011); Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); and Cable v. 
Agence France Presse, 728 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (declining to read such a limitation 
into section 1202). 
8 Murphy v Millennium Radio Group, 650 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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copy or phonorecord of the work,9 while others have rejected such a narrow 
view.10  Again the language of the statute does not command incorporation of the 
CMI in the copy of the work: “conveyed in connection with” does not mean “on 
copies,” and if a “performance of a work” is involved, embedding may not be 
possible.  Of particular relevance to authors, if the object of the transaction is a 
display of an artwork, its creator, understandably, may not wish to embed 
visually-perceptible CMI in the image.  If the statute aims to provide reliable 
information regarding the identity of the work, of its author, and of the terms and 
conditions of its exploitation, it would seem that providing the information in 
ways that do not imperil the integrity of the work could still meet Congress’ 
objectives.  At least one court, however, has stated that “if a general copyright 
notice appears on an entirely different webpage than the work at issue, then that 
CMI is not ‘conveyed’ with the work and no claim will lie under the DMCA.”11  
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant copied poems from plaintiff’s 
website and displayed them on the defendant’s own site.  The plaintiff argued that 
the defendant had, by placing copyright notices on the parts of its own site that 
contained the allegedly infringing poems (thereby attributing to itself the 
authorship of plaintiff’s poems), supplied false CMI in violation of § 1202.  While 
the court held that plaintiff’s assertion that defendant’s placement of a copyright 
notice directly within the title of one of the allegedly copied poems stated a claim 
for relief under the DMCA, it also ruled that the more remote location of a 
copyright notice relative to the other allegedly copied poems did not “convey” the 
CMI “with” the other alleged infringements.  In requiring that the false CMI be 
“conveyed with” the infringing works, the court seems to be reading “conveyed in 
connection with” out of the statute.  The former, incomplete, reading suggests the 
CMI must be amalgamated with the work; the latter leaves room for more distant 
placement, although the more clicks required to access the CMI, the less likely a 
court may be to find even a connection between the work and its “conveyance” to 
the end user. 
 Finally, many CMI claims against alteration or removal of authorship 
attribution are likely to founder on the statutory double intent standard.  Under 
section 1202(b), the wrongful act is not simply removing the attribution, or 
distributing or publicly performing or displaying the work without the attribution. 
The statute also requires that those who distribute, perform or display the work (1) 
have known that the attribution was removed or altered without the copyright 
owner’s authorization, and (2) that those who remove or alter the attribution, or 
who distribute or perform works whose attribution has been removed or altered, 
do so “knowing, or . . . having reasonable grounds to know that it will induce, 
                                                 
 9. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D.Cal.1999), aff’d., 336 F.3d 811 
(9th Cir. 2003) (information on photographer’s webpage, not on individual photographs); Schiffer 
Pub., Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (information on 
inside cover of book, not on individual photographs) 
 10. BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F.Supp.2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); See also 
Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F.Supp.2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing BanxCorp in 
declining to decide significance of CMI location on motion to dismiss). 
11 Personal Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com Inc., No 11 C 5177, 2012 WL 414803, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 8, 2012). 
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enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any right under this title.”  Thus, 
even intentional removal or alteration of authorship attribution is not unlawful if 
the copyright owner cannot show that the person who removed or altered the 
information knew that the removal would encourage or facilitate copyright 
infringement.12    
 The cases suggest that the second level of intent is most likely to be 
established when the defendant, having removed or altered the CMI, distributes 
the work without the accompanying information (or with altered information) to 
third parties, who will in turn make the work available to the public.  Thus, in 
McClatchey v. AP,13 in rejecting the AP’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court held: 
Under Plaintiff’s version of the facts, AP intentionally cropped the 
copyright notice out of the picture before distributing it to subscribers. 
This appears to be precisely the conduct to which Section 1202(b) is 
directed. As Plaintiff notes, the nature of APs’ business is to provide 
stories and pictures for use by its members and subscribers. Thus, a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that by cropping out the copyright 
notice, Defendant had the requisite intent to induce, enable, facilitate or 
conceal infringement.14 
While McClatchey concerned removal of a copyright notice, the decision is 
relevant to authorship attribution claims, because copyright notices often bear the 
author’s name.  In addition, even where the work did not include a copyright 
notice, intentional removal of the author’s name and redistribution of the work 
can facilitate infringement, at least where the work circulates without other 
information that indicates to intermediary distributors from whom to seek 
permission to exploit the work. 
 By contrast, where the person removing the authorship attribution has 
directly distributed the work to the public, it may be more difficult to show that 
the removal or alteration will facilitate copyright infringement, because it may be 
necessary to show that the defendant knew or should have known that end-
consumer recipients would be induced by the absence or alteration of the author’s 
name to infringe the work.  Absent evidence that the distributor expected end-
users in turn to redistribute, for example through file-sharing, the statutory 
standard may often prove insuperable  As a result, on the whole, section 1202 
does not afford authors a very effective vehicle to ensure the maintenance of 
authorship attribution. 
 
III Dastar and the Death of Attribution (and Integrity?) Rights Under the 
Lanham Act 
 
 For a time, it seemed as if the Lanham Federal Trademarks Act partially 
                                                 
 12.  See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Comms., 345 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2003); Kelly, 77 F. Supp. 
2d 1116; Schiffer, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090. 
 13. 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1190 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  See also Banxcorp,723 F. Supp. 2d 596; 
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F.Supp.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
14 McClatchey 82 U.S.P.Q. at 1196. 
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provided for a right of attribution: by making false and confusing designations of 
origin actionable, the Act--many thought--afforded authors relief against 
misattributions of authorship.15 Even so, the trademarks law would only have 
reprimanded giving credit to one to whom credit was not due; it would not have 
afforded an affirmative right to claim authorship. In other words, giving incorrect 
credit may have been actionable; giving no credit was not.16 
 In June of 2003, however, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Lanham 
Act to deny false attribution claims as to the origin of a “communicative product” 
in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.17 In Dastar, the Court made 
clear that a work’s entry into the public domain precludes resort to the Lanham 
Act to achieve a de facto prolongation of exclusive copyright-like rights. In so 
doing, however, the Court appears to have stricken the Lanham Act from the roll 
of laws authors might invoke in support of attribution rights.  
 The facts of the case had nothing to do with authors, and were very 
unappealing. In 1949, Twentieth Century Fox produced a multipart television 
series, Crusade in Europe, based on then-General Eisenhower’s campaign 
memoirs.18 In 1977, after Fox failed to renew the copyright registration, the work 
went into the public domain.19 In 1995, Dastar released a set of videos, 
Campaigns in Europe, substantially copied from Crusade.20 Dastar listed itself as 
the producer of Campaigns, without reference to Crusade or Fox. Fox sued, 
claiming that Dastar’s release of the videos under its own name constituted 
“reverse passing off” in violation of the Lanham Federal Trademarks Act, section 
43(a). Fox contended that substituting Dastar’s name for Fox’s constituted a 
“false designation of origin,” because Fox, the original producer, was the 
originator of the Crusade television series that Campaigns “bodily 
appropriated.”21 The district court agreed and awarded Fox double Dastar’s 
profits,22 thus granting Fox perhaps a higher damages award than it would have 
received for copyright infringement (had Fox’s copyright still been in force). The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion.23 The Supreme Court reversed, 
                                                 
15 The Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, a group formed at 
State Department behest whose report was submitted to Congress, concluded that U.S. law 
afforded “substantial protection . . . for the real equivalent of [the] moral rights” of attribution and 
integrity, particularly by recourse to the Lanham Act.  See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention at 35, 39--42, reprinted in 10 Colum. J.L. & 
Arts 513, 547, 551-554. 
16 See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1998) (claim against an architect 
who substituted his name for another’s on architectural plans); Lamothe v. Atl. Recording Corp., 
847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988) (claim by co-author against songwriter who published music 
under only his name); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim against film 
company who substituted one actor’s name for another in film credits). 
17 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
18 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25--26. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 26. 
21 Id. at 28. 
22 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. CV98-7189, 2000 WL 35503106 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 29, 2000). 
23  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distributing, 34 Fed. Appx. 312 (9th Cir. 2002) 
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8-0 (Justice Breyer recused).24 
 The unanimous opinion construed the statute’s prohibition on “us[ing] in 
commerce” (selling) any “false designation of origin . . . which . . . is likely to . . . 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the . . . origin . . . of his or her goods . . . by 
another person.”25 The Court held that “origin” in the sense of the Lanham Act 
does not mean the original creator of a work of authorship from which copies are 
made, but rather the source of the particular copies (goods) that are being 
distributed.26 Thus, a reverse passing off claim “would undoubtedly be sustained 
if [the defendant] had bought some of [the] Crusade videotapes and merely 
repackaged them as its own.”27 But the Court rejected the contention that a 
different concept of “origin” should apply to a “communicative product”--a work 
of authorship.  
 Arguably, the Court’s refusal to accord authors the status of “originators” 
of communicative works was limited to works whose copyrights had expired, 
rather than extending to all communicative works, whatever their copyright status. 
The Court referred some ten times to the copyright-expired status of Fox’s 
television series. The Court’s doubts about the validity of an interpretation of 
“origin” to mean “author” seem closely entwined with its concern to maintain the 
public domain. For example, the Court objected: “Reading ‘origin’ in [the 
trademarks act] to require attribution of uncopyrighted materials would pose 
serious practical problems. Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word 
‘origin’ has no discernable limits.”28 
 On the other hand, it is not clear why, under the concept of “origin” the 
Court attributed to the trademarks act, authors would qualify as originators of 
copyright-protected works. The Court’s declaration that “the phrase [‘origin of 
goods’] refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and 
not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those 
goods,”29 would seem to apply equally to in-copyright and copyright-expired 
works.   
 In fact, federal district court decisions have generally declined to limit 
Dastar’s application to public domain works.30  The list of decisions applying 
                                                 
24 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38. 
25 Lanham Trademarks Act §43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
26 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32--35. 
27 Id. at 31. 
28 Id. at 35. 
29 Id. at 37. 
30 See, e.g., Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357, 1361-62 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Dastar and 
Williams v. UMG Recording to support dismissal of “failure to attribute” claim); Williams v. 
UMG Recordings, Inc. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s 
holding did not depend on whether the works were copyrighted or not.”). For a general analysis of 
Dastar’s sweeping impact, including on state unfair competition claims, see Tom W. Bell, 
Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright 
Preemption, 65 Md. L. Rev. 206 (2006).  See also David A. Gerber, Copyright Reigns--Supreme: 
Notes on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 93 Trademark Rep. 1029, 1032 
(2003).  (“[A]lthough Dastar Corp. involved reverse passing off, its sweep is much wider.  The 
brightline rule rejecting authorial claims under §43(a) should lead to the death not only of the droit 
à la paternité or right of attribution but other ‘moral rights’ under §43(a) as well.”). 
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Dastar to rule that § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act concerns only tangible goods, 
and therefore precludes claims alleging misattribution of authorship, continues to 
grow, particularly in the context of disputes over authorship credit for scholarly 
works.  For example, in Rudovsky v West31  the court held the Lanham Act did not 
apply to claims of misattribution of authorship of a pocket part update of a legal 
treatise prepared by publisher’s staff but partly credited to the authors of the 
treatise, and in Romero v. Buhimschi32 the court rejected a § 43(a)(1)(A) claim 
concerning the alleged denial of coauthorship credit to a fellow medical 
researcher.33 In Vogel v. Wolters Kluwer34 the author of contributions to the first 
three editions of a textbook alleged that the fourth and fifth editions incorporated 
his contributions but without authorship credit to him; the court dismissed the 
claim on the ground that a false designation of origin under the Lanham Act 
concerns only the provenance of the physical copies of the books, not authorship; 
the court also held the state law unfair competition claims preempted by the 
Copyright Act.  Of course, Dastar’s impact is not limited to academic authors, as 
a host of decisions concerning commercial entertainment product demonstrates.35  
  
 By contrast, in Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc.36 the court declined to 
dismiss a Lanham Act claim against “reverse passing off” committed by a 
competitor who allegedly “scraped” plaintiff’s event-planning website in order to 
reproduce the information on competitor’s website.  In that case, however, the 
plaintiff also had a valid copyright claim; the court appears to have read Dastar as 
precluding “end-running” failed copyright claims, thus letting stand those Lanham 
Act claims that accompany a valid copyright action.   
 That reading, while consistent with the Dastar court’s preoccupation with 
                                                 
31 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1595 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
32 396 Fed. Appx. 224 (6th Cir. 2010) 
33 Id. at 232 (citing Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
34 630 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2008). 
35 See, e.g., Harbour v. Farquhar, 245 Fed.Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing claim involving 
musical compositions included in television programs); Chivalry Film Prods. v. NBC Universal, 
Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5627, 2006 WL 89944 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006) (screenwriter claimed producer 
of "Meet the Parents" copied his script and misattributed screenplay to third parties; court held 
Dastar required dismissal of misattribution claim); A Slice of Pie Prods. v. Wayans Bros. Entm't, 
392 F.Supp.2d 297 (D. Conn. 2005) (same re film "White Chicks"); Keane v. Fox, 297 F.Supp.2d 
921 (S.D. Tex. 2004), where the court dismissed plaintiff's claim that, as the originator of the idea 
of the "American Idol" television series, and developer of the "American Idol" mark, he should 
have been recognized and paid. The court held that Keane had not developed trademark rights in 
the term "American Idol." The court also ruled against any claim in the concept of the television 
series, citing Dastar: "the Lanham Act does not create a cause of action for 'plagiarism,' that is, 
'the use of otherwise unprotected works and inventions without attribution.'"; Hustlers v. 
Thomasson, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1923 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that Dastar's limitation of false 
designation of origin claims to the producer of physical copies bars not only claims by authors, but 
also by publishers; the court also follows Williams v. UMG Recordings in holding Dastar not 
limited to works in the public domain); Mays & Assoc. v. Euler, 370 F.Supp.2d 362 (D. Md. 
2005) (after Dastar, no Lanham Act claim for non-attribution of authorship of web design 
portfolio); JB Oxford & Co. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n., 427 F.Supp.2d 784 (M.D. Tenn. 
2006) (no § 43(a) claim against advertiser who allegedly copied plaintiff's advertisement and 
substituted its name for plaintiff's). 
36 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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maintaining the public domain, may clash with another aspect of the decision’s 
treatment of the relationship of copyright and trademark claims.  The Dastar court 
offered as an additional reason for rejecting section 43(a) attribution claims the 
inclusion in section 106A of the copyright act of (very) limited attribution rights 
in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.37 VARA applies to “work[s] of visual 
art,”38 a class confined to the original work or up to two hundred signed and 
numbered copies of a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or a photographic image 
“produced for exhibition purposes only,” so long as the work is not “made for 
hire.”39 VARA affords artists whose works fall within its restrictive definition a 
kind of private “Landmarks” law to preserve their works against mutilation or 
destruction. Attribution rights, albeit included, are not the focus of the Act. 
Indeed, VARA’s restriction to physical originals makes that statute a very feeble 
measure for enforcing artists’ attribution rights: a “work of visual arts” excludes 
mass market multiples. Thus, there is no VARA right to compel attribution for 
one’s artwork if the artist’s name has been left off anything more than the original 
or a signed and numbered limited edition of two hundred. And, of course, VARA 
does nothing for literary, musical, audiovisual, or most other authors.  
Nonetheless, the Dastar court appears to suggest that VARA’s enactment promotes 
a negative inference that VARA is the only federal law locus for attribution rights: if 
authors already enjoyed attribution rights, VARA would be superfluous, and “[a] 
statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be 
avoided.”40 
 The Court’s characterization of VARA as “superfluous,” is, however, plainly 
incorrect.  Section 43(a) does not make VARA superfluous. There may be narrow 
areas of overlap, but VARA, in its severely constricted zone, affords a significant 
right that section 43(a) does not: an affirmative right to claim authorship, not 
merely a right to object to misrepresentations of authorship that confuse 
consumers as to the work’s origin. Moreover, VARA’s beneficiaries are artists, 
but section 43(a)’s are the consuming public, and the rationales for the laws are 
different: copyright is a property right protecting against copying per se; 
trademark law derives from the tort action of “passing off” and, in U.S. law, does 
not prohibit copying as such, but only copying which introduces materially false 
or misleading information into the marketplace.  Courts addressing overlapping 
intellectual property claims have acknowledged that differently motivated laws 
may yield similar results when brought to bear on the same subject matter, yet one 
does not drive out the other.41  
                                                 
37. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
39. Id. 
40. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (2003). 
41. See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196–99 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (stating that a publisher of children’s books in the public domain could bring a trademark 
claim against defendant’s copying of particular illustrations from the book, and commenting that 
“[b]ecause the nature of the property right conferred by copyright is significantly different from 
that of trademark, trademark protection should be able to co-exist, and possibly to overlap, with 
copyright protection without posing preemption difficulties”); cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that federal design patent law preempts state laws 
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 The Dastar Court nonetheless may have left open two avenues within the 
trademarks act to vindicate creators’ rights. First, the Court recognized reverse 
passing off claims when the defendant has “merely repackaged . . . as [his] own” 
goods which the defendant has not otherwise altered.42 Second, it preserved 
claims under a related section of the trademarks act. The Court stated, 
If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied the 
Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the 
impression that the video was quite different from that series, then one or 
more of the respondents might have a cause of action--not for reverse 
passing off under the “confusion . . . as to the origin” provision of § 
43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the “misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics [or] qualities” provision of § 43(a)(1)(B). For 
merely saying it is the producer of the video, however, no Lanham Act 
liability attaches to Dastar.43 
 With respect to what a “mere repackaging” reverse passing off claim 
would cover, it is important to recognize that, notwithstanding Dastar’s emphasis 
on free copying from the public domain, not every exploitation that the copyright 
law might permit will escape Lanham Act condemnation. For example, the 
copyright law “first sale doctrine” entitles purchasers of tangible copies of a work 
of authorship to resell, rent, or lend those copies without the copyright owner’s 
authorization.44 But, even under Dastar, that does not mean that the Lanham Act 
will allow me to purchase copies of the latest Brad Meltzer or John Grisham legal 
thrillers and resell them under my own name. In fact, that would seem to be 
exactly the situation posited in the Court’s caveat that a reverse passing off claim 
“would undoubtedly be sustained if [the defendant] had bought some of [the] 
Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them as its own.”45 
 Nor, despite the Court’s linkage of “origin” with physical copies, should 
the “mere repackaging” claim be limited to communication of physical copies 
originally manufactured by the trademarks claimant. For one thing, it would be 
extraordinarily formalistic were the “mere repackaging” claim confined to 
physical copies that Dastar recycles, thus excluding exact copies that Dastar 
reproduces. The “goods” at issue should be understood to be any physical 
reproductions, not only the ones made by the claimant. Otherwise, the statute 
would reach the soda company that purchased old Coca-Cola bottles (whose 
vintage design is undoubtedly, as a matter of copyright or design patent law, in 
the public domain) and refilled them with a substitute cola, but not the soda 
                                                                                                                                                             
protecting against copying of boat hull designs but does not preempt state laws protecting 
consumers against misleading presentations of products); Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632 
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding federal trademark protection for product configurations does not 
necessarily conflict with federal patent law); In re Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that because “Congress has not provided that an author-inventor must 
elect between securing a copyright or securing a design patent,” the author-inventor may claim 
both forms of protection).  
42 Id. at 31. 
43 Id. at 38. 
44 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (2006). 
45 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38. 
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company who makes new bottles in the shape of the Coca-Cola bottle and fills 
them with the substitute.46 
 The Cvent court applied the “mere repackaging” rationale to sustain the 
availability of a reverse passing off claim: 
There is no controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit on point, nor has 
this Court ever confronted this precise issue [of the post-Dastar 
subsistence of reverse passing off claims]. However, Cvent appears to 
have the better of the argument, at least insofar as its complaint does not 
assert that Eventbrite has passed off its ideas as its own, but rather that 
Eventbrite has re-branded and re-packaged its product (the CSN venue 
database) and sold it as its own. Admittedly, the Supreme Court's 
"tangible goods" language in the Dastar opinion is confusing, and tends 
to suggest that electronic products are not covered by the Lanham Act. 
However, the Dastar opinion also makes clear that the Court used that 
language simply to distinguish goods and products offered for sale 
(which receive Lanham Act protection) from any "idea, concept, or 
communication embodied in those goods" (which are protected only by 
copyright laws).47 
The Cvent court may have understated Dastar’s reach with respect to overlapping 
copyright and trademark claims, but the Cvent court is also correct that Dastar’s 
treatment of what constitute “goods” under the Lanham Act is somewhat 
inconsistent, if not incoherent.  Sometimes, “goods” comprehend only tangible 
copies, such as Dastar’s videocassettes, but at other times, “goods” could also 
extend to intellectual products.  The latter reading emerges from the Court’s 
reference to subsisting section 43(a)(1)(B) claims against “false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . 
misrepresent[] the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of his or her or another 
person’s goods [or] services.”48 Arguably, removing the author’s or performer’s 
name and replacing it with another’s constitutes a false or misleading 
representation of fact (who is the author of this book; who performed in this film) 
that misrepresents the nature, characteristics, or qualities (authorship; 
performance) of the goods (the work). For purposes of section 43(a)(1)(B), then, 
the Court appears to have acknowledged that “goods” can mean a 
“communicative work,” while, for purposes of section 43(a)(1)(A), “goods” 
would mean only the physical copies.  
 The potential availability of a section 43(a)(1)(B) claim becomes 
particularly significant if, after Dastar, the “origin” of copyrighted works is 
falsely designated only when physical copies are mislabeled as to their 
                                                 
46 Cf. id. at 32 (stating Lanham Act “forbids, for example, the Coca-Cola Company’s passing of its 
product as Pepsi-Cola or reverse passing off Pepsi-Cola as its product.”) 
47 Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 936 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citations omitted). See 
also Cable v. Agence France Presse, 728 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (copying and reselling 
plaintiff’s photographs, stripped of plaintiff’s byline, under photo agency’s name states a claim for 
mere repackaging).  A “mere repackaging” claim, however, might not lie when the defendant has 
not copied the entire work. See, e.g., Personal Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com Inc., No 
11 C 5177, 2012 WL 414803 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2012). 
48 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30 n.4. 
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manufacture. But preservation of section 43(a)(1)(B) claims is problematic, as 
lower courts have recognized: if it sufficed merely to recast a “false designation 
of origin” claim as a “misrepresentation of the nature, characteristics or qualities” 
claim, then Dastar would be completely toothless.  Thus, for example, the court 
in Antidote International Films v Bloomsbury Publishing, PLC,49 observed: “If 
authorship were a ‘characteristic[]’ or ‘qualit[y]’ of a work, then the very claim 
Dastar rejected under § 43(a)(1)(A) would have been available under §  
43(a)(1)(B).”50 By the same token, the Romero court rejected the § 43(a)(1)(B) 
claim that false authorship credit falsely represented the "nature, characteristics, 
[or] qualities", because these elements “refer[] to the characteristics of the good 
itself, rather than authorship designation.”51 
 Might integrity claims fare better under § 43(a)(1)(B), since they address 
alterations to the (intellectual) goods, rather than attribution of their “origin”?  In 
Gilliam v ABC, a majority of the Second Circuit ruled that broadcasting a 
truncated version of “Monty Python’s Flying Circus” under the group’s name 
constituted a “false designation of origin” (under an earlier text of section 
43(a)).52  One may wonder, given Dastar’s emphasis on physical goods, whether 
this decision is still good law.   Professor Justin Hughes has argued that a proper 
reading of Dastar would preserve not only § 43(a)(1)(B) claims, but even some § 
43(a)(1)(A) claims.53  He acknowledges that the broad reading given to Dastar by 
some lower courts54 would mean that Gilliam’s authority is at best precarious.  He 
contends, however, that Gilliam is distinguishable because it concerned 
misattribution, while Dastar concerned nonattribution.  In his opinion, it “would 
not make any sense” to apply Dastar’s “tight, physical manufacturing definition 
of origin” to § 43’s prohibition on false or misleading descriptions or 
representations of fact.  Dastar would require, instead, a focus on issues such as 
“assertion versus omission, passing off versus reverse passing off, and origin 
versus affiliation.”  Misattribution claims should be actionable after Dastar as 
long as the misattribution “can reasonably be characterized as a description or 
misrepresentation of fact.”  Otherwise, he posits, a pornographic film that credits 
Steven Spielberg as the director would not be actionable --- an absurd result and 
“unlikely what the Court intended.”55  By the same token, attributions of distorted 
versions of an author’s work would misrepresent its “nature, characteristics or 
qualities.”56  But even if § 43(a)(1)(B) integrity or attribution right claims survive 
Dastar, that provision presents an additional hurdle: the factual misrepresentation 
must occur “in commercial advertising or promotion.”  Merely purveying or 
                                                 
49 467 F. Supp. 2d. 394 (SDNY 2006) 
50 Id. at 400. 
51 Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 F. App’x 224, 232 (6th Cir. 2010).  Accord Personal Keepsakes, 
2012 WL 414803. 
52 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1978). 
53 Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 659. 
54 See, e.g., Carrol v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) ; General Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 
F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004). 
55 Hughes, supra note 53, at 695. 
56 Id. at 680 (quoting Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a)(1)(B).. 
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performing mislabeled works may not suffice.57 
  
 
IV Contracting Into Moral Rights? 
 
 If laws regulating digital markets for copyrighted works have failed to 
provide a source of protection for authors’ attribution and integrity interests, 
might authors marshal digital technology itself to their aid?  Specifically, might 
authors avail themselves of the ubiquitous reach of online contracts to require 
recognition of their authorship status and respect for the integrity of their works?  
In the off-line world, an author might bind a co-contractant, usually a publisher or 
other intermediary distributor, to honor her moral rights, but, lacking privity with 
downstream exploiters, the author would have no contract claim against a 
sublicensee who distorted the work or failed to credit the author (though she 
might have a claim against the licensing publisher, if the author’s agreement 
required the publisher to include a moral rights clause in sublicenses and the 
publisher failed to do so).  An online contract embedded in the work and which 
conditioned access to the work on the user’s clicked-on agreement to adhere to 
the author’s terms and conditions, however, might bind all users, whether they 
acquired access directly from the author’s webpage, or instead from other sources 
of digital dissemination, including other websites or other users.  
 
 To some extent a “viral” contract regime of moral rights already exists, 
through Creative Commons licenses.  The default CC license requires attribution 
of authorship, and the author may also choose to include an “ND” (no derivatives) 
icon, which might serve to instruct users not to alter or modify the work.58  But 
CC licenses accompany works distributed online for free.  For authors who seek 
to earn a living from their work, obligatory gratuity may pose an insuperable 
shortcoming.  A CC-licensed work may help introduce an author to an audience, 
but at some point a professional author needs to be paid.  Authors thus may face 
the choice between respect for their names and their works, but without 
remuneration, or remuneration at the risk of their moral rights.  More 
fundamentally, as Professor Sundara Rajan has eloquently explained, if CC-
                                                 
57 Accord, Gillian Davies & Kevin Garnett, Moral Rights, 28-046 (2011) (“Simply mislabeling 
and selling a work without advertising the name may not constitute ‘promotion’ and the promotion 
itself might not always contain the alleged false representation.”) 
58 It is not clear whether the excluded “derivatives” are “derivative works” in the copyright sense, 
in which case the instruction might not bar all modifications or alterations, but only those which 
sufficiently transform the work to constitute new works of authorship.  To the extent that 
modifications may compromise a work’s integrity without necessarily yielding a new work, the 
ND icon would not fully correspond to the moral right of integrity.  See Sundara Rajan, supra, at 
927.  On the other hand, CC’s plain-English explanation of what ND means, “This license allows 
for redistribution, commercial and non-commercial, as long as it is passed along unchanged and in 
whole, with credit to you.” [cite, (emphasis supplied)], suggests a non-technical understanding of 
the term. 
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implemented moral rights come at the price to authors of free distribution of their 
works, then the overall endeavor of authorship becomes devalued.59 
 
 The CC license may not be the only viral copyright license in town (or in 
some less terrestrial setting),60 but there appear to be no equivalent licenses that 
also provide that the recipient of any internet-distributed copy must pay the 
original creator some fee.  In theory, such a license could be devised, and would 
enforce the fee requirement through a DRM system that might, for example, 
prevent access to the work unless the recipient clicks through to the artist’s 
website, agrees to the license terms and makes the payment.  But the obstacles to 
successful propagation of such a license extend beyond the obvious problem of 
DRM-cracking (notwithstanding its illegality under the DMCA).61  Even 
assuming that access protections remained in place, authors who choose to 
distribute their works under what we might call an “Authorship Integrity” license 
will need to attract a public.  Creative Commons-licensed works are easily found, 
thanks to a well-developed search feature.62 The deviser of an AI license created 
and simply distributed “into the wild” without the type of planning and marketing 
Creative Commons received would likely struggle to compile an index of works 
using that license and to make that index known to the public.  Participation of 
author organizations such as the Authors Guild, the Graphic Artists Guild and the 
National Writers Union in an AI licensing scheme might alleviate the difficulties.  
Similarly, if major publishing houses were to adopt AI licenses for their works (or 
to recommend the use of the license to all of their authors), the license would 
receive significant publicity, and the creation of a database of works released 
under the license might become more feasible.  Publisher participation, however, 
assumes alignment of their interests with those of authors.  While the challenges 
of digital media may underscore a common concern for preserving the 
authenticity of works,63 it may be overly optimistic to trust that publishers will 
always exploit works in perfect harmony with their authors’ aspirations. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Over ten years after my initial speculations about the future of moral rights 
in the digital environment, the day that U.S. authors’ rights of attribution and 
integrity attain their majority remains far off.  The current positive law largely 
confines them to a Lost Boys’ “Neverland.”  By contrast, de facto implementation 
of attribution rights through digital watermarking and other means of 
incorporating authorship information in connection with the communication of 
digital copies or performances of work makes possible the recognition of many 
levels of creative contributions.  That is, not only with respect to works by a 
                                                 
59 Sundara Rajan, supra, at 931-936 (“The Dark Side of Open Access: Art as a Profession in 
Decline”). 
60 Other “viral” licenses include the GNU Free Documentation License, The Free Art License, the Game 
System License and the Design Science license. 
61 See 17 USC sec 1201. 
62 http://search.creativecommons.org/ including adding “CC search” to the user’s browser. 
63 As suggested in Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age?.  See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 14. 
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single or a small number of authors, but also for works to which a large number of 
participants contribute, perhaps in a continuous manner.  Whether viral contracts 
or voluntary online practices accomplish these attributions, their achievement 
seems feasible.  Regarding integrity rights, however, respect for the work as the 
author created it may, in the absence of enforceable legal or contract norms, yield 
to online users’ preference for “remix.”  In that light, an alternative right of the 
author, posited in the previous essay,64 to compel comparison of the altered 
version with the original by obliging the modifying user to link back to it, is better 
than nothing.  Moreover, variations on this theme already exist online, notably the 
Wikipedia feature that reveals all changes made to a given entry.65  But, without a 
legal obligation to disclose alterations or link back to the original, the prospects 
for even this weakened integrity right do not presage imminent adolescence, much 
less a vigorous adulthood, for moral rights in the US. 
                                                 
64 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright for the Information Age, 75 Or. 
L. Rev. 19, 47 (1996). 
65 Edits to individual Wikipedia pages may be viewed by clicking the “Page History” tab  that appears on 
each page.  “Page History” allows users to see previous revisions, including the time and date of revision 
and the user name or IP address of the individual making the changes.  Wikipedia also provides a tool 
which compares previous versions of the page against each other.  See Help: Page history, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Page_history (last modified Dec. 10, 2011).  Members of the Wikipedia 
community are currently engaged in a project to allow for simplified search of these page revisions.  See 
WikiBlame, http://wikipedia.ramselehof.de/wikiblame.php. 
